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A Mobile ad hoc Network or MANET is a wireless network of mobile devices that has the ability to self-configure 
and self-organise and is characterised by an absence of centralised administration and network infrastructure. An 
appreciable number of routing protocols used in a typical MANET have left the critical aspect of security out of 
consideration by assuming that all of its constituent nodes are trustworthy and non-malicious. In this paper, we 
discuss some of the major threats that such networks are vulnerable to, because of these inherently insecure 
protocols. The focus is specifically on the source-initiated and on-demand routing protocols. Further, solutions and 
modifications to these protocols that have been proposed over time, enabling them to mitigate the aforementioned 
threats to some extent, are also analysed.  
 







A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) consists of nodes 
that communicate with each other via wireless mediums. 
These nodes also function as routers and forward packets 
to others. MANETs, by their very nature, do not have any 
centralised administration nor require any fixed network 
infrastructure and this makes it quite easy to set up the 
network quickly. 
Routing in such networks is achieved via the use of a 
number of specific protocols that attempt to counter the 
challenge posed by dynamic topologies and are widely in 
use today. Although numerous ad hoc network routing 
protocols (Dynamic State Routing (DSR) [1], Ad hoc on-
demand vector (AODV) [2]) have been proposed, they 
have generally assumed an environment where all the 
nodes are co-operative and trustworthy and no security 
mechanism has been considered [3][23]. We consider 
only the on-demand routing protocols AODV and DSR in 
this paper on account of their dynamic nature, better 
performance with lesser overhead and also their wider 
acceptance. 
 
2. VULNERABILITIES IN MANETs  
MANETs suffer from a number of vulnerabilities owing, 
primarily, to the fact that they depend on their constituent 
nodes to function effectively. Malicious nodes may 
interfere with the smooth functioning of the network 
through quite a few ways, as described below. 
 
2.1  Identity Spoofing  
Media Access Control (MAC) and Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses are frequently used in MANETs to verify and 
ascertain the identity of its nodes. However, these 
addresses may be easily spoofed using tools that are 
publicly available, which leads to a spoofing attack [5]. In 
this attack, the malicious user attempts to acquire the 
identity of a legitimate node in the network. 
Masquerading as a legitimate user allows the malicious 
node to avail of privileged services, that are otherwise 
accessible to only genuine nodes, and become an 
authorized entity in the network. This attack aims to 
 establish a connection that will enable the attacker to 
access the  sensitive data of the other hosts [6] [7].  
 
2.2  Denial of Service (DoS) 
DoS is one of the most well known attacks on computer 
networks largely because of the impact it has on the 
smooth functioning of the network. This kind of attack is 
especially damaging to MANETs owing to the limited 
communication bandwidth and resources of the nodes [8]. 
In the AODV protocol for instance, a large number of 
RREQs (message requests) are sent to a destination node 
on the network that is non-existent. As there is no reply to 
these RREQs, they will flood the entire network leading 
to a consumption of all of the node battery power, along 
with network bandwidth and this could lead to denial-of-
service. 
 
2.3  Black Hole Attack 
The goal of the malicious node in this attack, is to drop all 
packets that are directed to it instead of forwarding them 
as intended. It uses its routing protocol in order to 
advertise itself as having the shortest route to the target 
node or to any packet that it wants to intercept.     
The malicious node advertises its availability of new 
routes without checking its routing table [12]. In this way 
the malicious node will always have availability of routes 
while replying to the route request and hence intercept the 
data packet. As a result of the dropped packets, the 
amount of retransmission consequently increases leading 
to congestion. 
There is a more subtle form of this attack wherein the 
attacker selectively forwards packets instead of dropping 
all of them altogether. Packets originating from some 
particular nodes may be modified or suppressed while 
leaving the data from the other nodes unaffected, thus  
limiting the suspicion of its malicious behaviour by the 
other nodes [13]. 
 
2.4  Wormhole Attack 
A wormhole [10] is a combination of two or more 
malicious nodes belonging to the ad hoc network that are 
connected by a faster, direct connection. In this kind of 
attack, an attacker records information at a source or 
origin, tunnels it through this channel to a target point  
and retransmits the information in the neighbourhood of 
the destination. The two nodes are more than one hop 
away from each other on the network.  
Since a wormhole attack can be launched without 
compromising any node or even the integrity and 
authenticity of the communication and is implemented 
with very few resources, it is difficult to detect [11]. 
 
2.5  Routing Table / Cache Poisoning 
In this kind of attack, hostile nodes in the networks send 
fictitious routing updates or modify genuine route update 
packets that are sent to other uncompromised nodes. 
Routing table poisoning may result in sub-optimal 
routing, congestion in portions of the network, or even 
make some parts of the network inaccessible [13]. In the 
case of on-demand routing protocols that we are 
considering, each node maintains a route cache, that 
contains information about specific routes that have 
become well known or have been frequently used and an 
adversary may also poison the route cache to achieve 
similar objectives. 
 
2.6  Colluding Attacks 
This kind of threat is encountered when two or more 
nodes collude in order to disrupt the smooth functioning 
of the network by modifying or dropping all packets 
addressed to them. 
Apart from being difficult to detect, it can also cause a 
significant amount of damage and poses a more serious 
threat than similar attacks such as the black hole attack. 
The authors of [14]  discuss this in the OSLR protocol 
and show that two colluding nodes can take down a 
maximum of 100 percent of data packets. 
 
2.7  Rushing Attacks 
In [18], the authors discuss an attack called the “Rushing” 
attack that acts as an effective denial-of-service attack. In 
this attack, the route request (RREQ) packet sent by the 
source node to the malicious node is flooded throughout 
the network by this malicious node quickly enough to 
prevent other nodes from reacting to the same RREQ. The 
other nodes that receive the duplicate RREQ from the 
attacker simply ignore them. Hence, any route discovered 
by the source node will have the malicious node as an 
intermediate point in the route [13]. Most of the current 
on-demand ad hoc routing protocols are vulnerable to this 
attack due to the fact that most of them use duplicate 
suppression during the route discovery process. None of 
the on-demand protocols, including SAODV, SRP, 
Ariadne, SAR and ARAN (that were all designed to be 
secure) are affected by rushing attacks since these are 
extremely difficult to detect. 
 
3. METHODS PROPOSED TO SECURE ON-  
DEMAND ROUTING PROTOCOLS                         
  
AODV and DSR are the most popular on-demand 
protocols. They enable nodes on the network to pass 
messages, via their neighbours, to nodes with which they 
cannot directly communicate. This is achieved by 
discovering routes along which messages can be passed 
and they ensure that these routes are devoid of loops and 
try to find the shortest possible path. Further, they are also 
able to handle changes in routes and can create new routes 
if there is an error or change in topology, which is a very 
important requirement for routing in MANETs [4].   
Notable mitigation techniques proposed for the 
vulnerabilities encountered in these on-demand protocols 
are as under. 
      
3.1  Secure AODV (SAODV) 
 Manel Guerrero Zapata and N. Asokan have proposed 
SAODV (Secure AODV) in  [15], which is an extension 
of the AODV protocol. Routing messages in SAODV 
such as route requests and route replies are authenticated 
to guarantee their integrity and authenticity. The source 
node signs the routing message with its private key, and 
the recipient nodes verify the signature using the public 
key of the source. Since the hop count must be 
incremented at each hop, the sender is unable to sign it. A 
hash chain mechanism is used to prevent any modification 
or tampering of the hop count by hostile intermediate 
nodes [16]. 
Fields in the RREQ and RREP packets are authenticated 
in SAODV.  In SAODV, an RREQ packet includes a 
route request single signature extension (RREQ-SSE). An 
upper bound for the hop count is chosen by the source 
node and it generates a one-way hash chain. The length of 
this one-way hash chain equals the maximum hop count 
incremented by one. The route request and the anchor of 
this hash chain are both signed by the source node and 
both are included in the RREQ single signature extension 
(RREQ-SSE). Based on the hop count in the route request 
header, an element of the hash chain is included in the 
single signature extension.  
SAODV however, suffers from performance issues on 
account of the use of computation-heavy asymmetric 
cryptography methods. A node is compelled to generate 
(or verify) a signature each time it generates (or receives) 
a routing message. A protocol called Adaptive SAODV 
(A-SAODV) has been proposed by Cerri and Ghioni in 
[28] to mitigate this. 
 
3.2  Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks 
(ARAN) 
ARAN, proposed by Dahill et al. in [20], is a secure 
routing protocol based on the on-demand protocols. It 
makes use of asymmetric cryptography and hence a 
universally trusted digital certification authority (CA) 
which assigns a digital certificate to every node on the 
network. ARAN uses peers and trusted third parties to 
ensure safety in ad hoc networks [19]. The five major 
components in ARAN are, Certification, Authenticated 
Route Discovery, Authenticated Route Set up, Route 
Maintenance, and Key Revocation [29]. All nodes that 
want to enter the network must request a certificate from 
the CA.  
 
The initiator node starts the communication by sending 
the route discovery packet and the target node replies with 
an RREP packet to the initiator, where it is verified. Every 
node on any particular route that receives a route request 
(RREQ), strips the signature and certificate of the 
previous node and appends its own into the packet before 
despatching it. 
 
Since the RREQs and RREPs are authenticated for every 
hop in ARAN, impersonation is easily avoided. As with 
SAODV, ARAN uses asymmetric key cryptography 
which slows down the overall performance of the ad hoc 
network. ARAN is affected by the Wormhole, black hole, 
DoS attacks [19], relay attacks [22] and also the rushing 
attack (that all on-demand protocols are vulnerable to) 
[18]. 
 
3.3  Security-Aware Ad hoc Routing (SAR) 
SAR [30] attempts to implement a more generalized way 
of providing security to routing protocols. It does this by 
incorporating security metrics into its base routing 
protocols (AODV and DSR) themselves (into the RREQ 
packets) and alters its forwarding behaviour.  
When intermediate nodes on a route receive a route 
request packet having a certain security metric or trust 
level, they will only be able to use or forward the packet 
if they can provide the requisite security / trust level.  
SAR lets us use security as a metric that in turn, lets the 
ad hoc routing protocols discover routes efficiently. 
Though, it is unable to clearly state how to use it as such 
[31]. 
SAR prevents a few attacks such as spoofing and the 
black hole attack among others. However it is found to be 
vulnerable to DoS, Wormholes and Rushing [18]. 
 
3.4  Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) 
  
The Secure routing protocol developed by Papadimitratos 
and Haas in [17] is again an extension to the on-demand 
protocols. There are three important assumptions made by 
the authors viz. bidirectional communication, presence of 
a security association between the source and destination 
and the absence of colluding nodes. Further, the two 
communicating nodes must have a shared key for 
communication and verification [21].  
 
SRP was claimed to guarantee the acquisition of accurate 
topological information and also that a node initiating the 
route discovery process would be able to discard replies 
from malicious nodes claiming false topological 
information, thus ensuring maximum safety.  
Although it prevents the black hole attack and also the 
attacks due to incorrect routing information, it does not 
solve the problem of protecting transmitted data (handled 
by the Secure Message Transmission Protocol) and is 
only concerned with obtaining correct topological 
information [29]. It is vulnerable to the wormhole, 
rushing, DoS and invisible node attacks [22]. 
 
 
3.5  Ariadne 
 
Ariadne is a robust protocol based on Dynamic Source 
Routing that has been proposed by Hu et al. [24] that 
makes use of the TESLA [25] broadcast authentication 
technology (which uses the message authentication code 
(MAC) to verify a message and also has anti-spoofing 
mechanisms). Ariadne makes use of symmetric key 
cryptography. It also uses a one way hash along with a 
MAC using a shared key between the source and the 
destination in order to authenticate the source at the 
destination. Every intermediate node on a particular route 
adds, along with its address, its own message 
authentication code. As a result, the source node can 
authenticate all individual entries in the route reply path.   
 
The basic operation of the protocol can be summarised as 
follows: 
 A route request packet is sent out by the initiator 
when communication is to  be commenced. The RREQ 
has information such as an identifier for the particular 
route that has been discovered along with a TESLA time 
interval. 
 Upon receipt of the RREQ, the recipient 
intermediate node checks whether the TESLA time 
interval is still valid. 
 The hash function described earlier is used to 
check the authentication. Each hop on the path is verified 
by the target node by comparing the computed hash and 
the received hash [26]. 
 
Ariadne has been shown to be vulnerable to the invisible 
node attack [27] (where a node participates in a routing 
protocol that implements identification, without revealing 
its identity). It is also affected by rushing [18], wormhole, 
DoS and the invisible node attack as discussed in [22]. 
 
 
3.6  Miscellaneous 
Apart from secure protocols themselves, a number of 
individual methods specific to certain kinds of attacks 
have been suggested to mitigate threats that other 
protocols may or may not deal with. 
For countering black hole attacks, the authors of [33] have 
proposed a three layer enforcement strategy to secure 
MANETs by integrating three layers, the prevention  
layer  (based  on  cryptographic  techniques), detection-
reaction  layer  (based  on monitoring  technique) and 
enforcement layer (based on obligations). An alternate 
method to detect single black hole nodes has been 
discussed in [9]. 
In case of the DoS or distributed DoS attacks due to route 
request flooding in MANETs, a scheme based on the 
addition of the parameters RREQ_ACCEPT_LIMIT and 
RREQ_BLACKLIST_LIMIT  to the original AODV has 
been proposed in [32]. 
In the case of Wormhole attacks that affect all of the 
secure on-demand protocols discussed thus far, Lazos et 
al. have presented a cryptography-based solution in [11] 
and have analytically shown that an appropriate choice of 
network parameters can almost completely eliminate the 
probability of wormhole links. Apart from this, TIK, a 
protocol proposed in [34], has been used by the authors to 
implement temporal packet leashes which defend against 
the wormhole attack. 
In [35], Dey et al. have introduced an improved data 
hiding technique using prime numbers, which is an 
improvement over the Fibonacci LSB data hiding method 
described by Battisti et al. in [36] and this enables secret 
messages to be embedded in higher bit planes. This idea 
may be extended to increasing security in Ad hoc 
networks as well. 
 
A method for detecting the sinkhole attack is proposed in 
[37] based on an incremental learning algorithm. The 
authors have confirmed via experiments that this method 
 can be used to detect different kinds of sinkhole attacks as 
well. 
 
In [18], the authors have introduced Rushing Attack 
Prevention (RAP) protocol to prevent the powerful 
rushing attack in routing protocols that use duplicate 
suppression, such as all of the current on-demand 
protocols discussed in this paper. RAP also does not incur 
any extra cost to the underlying routing protocol it is 
merged with unless the underlying protocol cannot find 
any valid routes. 
 
 
Table I: Various on-demand Secure Protocols mapped to the attacks that they are vulnerable to along with their base 
protocols 
 
S. No. Secure on-demand routing protocol 
Attacks that the protocols 
are vulnerable to 
Base Protocol 
1 SAODV 




Wormhole, Black hole, 
DoS [19], Rushing [18], 




Rushing [18], DoS, 
Wormhole 
AODV / DSR 
4 SRP 
Rushing [18], Invisible 




Rushing [18], Invisible 






4.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have discussed some of the 
important threats that mobile ad hoc networks using 
on-demand routing protocols have to encounter. 
We have also listed some of the notable solutions that 
have been proposed to provide for security in such 
MANETs. Further, we have described their modus 
operandi, key advantages and the threats that they are 
vulnerable to. TABLE I at the end of section three 
summarizes the attacks that these secure protocols do not 
guard against along with the underlying on-demand 
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